Reconstructing
Consciousness, Mind and Being
The Ninth
Annual Conference of the Consciousness
and Experiential Psychology Section of
the British Psychological Society
St Annes College, Oxford, 16th-18th
September 2005.
Reviewed by Robert Pepperell
Everyone who contributes to Consciousness
Studies agrees there is something to study,
but no one seems to quite agree what.
This becomes apparent at conferences,
where both finer points and fundamental
issues are being debated simultaneously.
Part of the problem, but also what makes
the area so dynamic and invigorating,
is the variety of disciplines that can
stake a claim to the field. Ostensibly
a meeting centred on Psychology (the CEP
is a section of the British Psychological
Society), this event attracted delegates
from a wide range of practices and traditions,
including psychiatrists, philosophers,
physicists, and healers.
Unfortunately I was
late arriving and so missed the first
keynote by Thomas Metzinger, an important
figure in contemporary philosophy, who
addressed the conference theme of Reconstructing
Consciousness, Mind and Being by tackling
the most notorious problem in Consciousness
Studies the so-called hard
problem of first person perspective,
phenomenal experience. His aim is to provide
an "empirically plausible theory
of mental representation" by positing
a new theoretical entity: the "phenomenal
self model" that, reading from the
abstract, is generated by a "genetically
determined neuromatrix whose activation
patterns could be the basis of the body
image and the subjective experience of
embodiment." According to Metzinger,
subjective experience from the first-person
perspective only arises, however, when
the biological system naively "confuses"
itself with the internally generated model.
It is an interesting idea that appears
to be supported by recent neurological
evidence about the phantom limb
syndrome, where amputees continue to experience
sensation in limbs they no longer have.
This suggests that we each have a tangible
internal map of our bodies that can be
experienced independently from the parts
of the body to which it refers.
Richard Bentall is an eminent clinical
psychiatrist whose recent book, Madness
Explained, has been the subject of
much heated discussion in mental health
circles. He is challenging the foundational
doctrines of his field, namely the taxonomy
of psychosis established by Emil Kraepelin
in the late nineteenth century, which
is still largely in force today. Bentall
argues not just that Kraeplelins
claims (for instance, that there is a
clear division between madness and sanity)
are medically inaccurate but that they
are positively injurious, leading to inappropriate
and sometimes severely destructive medical
treatments and social policies. His response
is to advocate a form of diagnosis that
concentrates on specific symptoms, that
is, certain kinds of behaviour and experience,
rather than pre-existing categories of
clinical condition, such as schizophrenia.
Using epidemiological and other data,
he showed that boundaries between psychotic
and non-psychotic mental functioning are
much fuzzier than the discipline of Psychiatry
formally allows, and that in fact psychotic
behaviours and experiences are distributed
much more widely through the general population
than is normally recognised. His call
was for a much more humane approach to
diagnosis and treatment, including greater
cognisance being taken of environmental
factors such as racial and sexual abuse,
which can be shown to have a dramatic
influence on the occurrence and distribution
of psychotic illnesses. He was also scathing
of the role of pharmaceutical companies
in distorting clinical trials in other
to further their own interests.
The final keynote was delivered by Ravi
Ravindra, former professor of Physics
and currently Professor Emertitus at Dalhousie
University. He offered thoughts on the
comparison between (what are broadly categorised
as) Western and Eastern traditions in
their approach to mind, science, and philosophy.
He argued that the cultures have more
in common than is often supposed, but
that this commonality is more evident
in the spiritual traditions than the philosophical
or scientific ones. While science and
philosophy as modes of investigation seek
to activate the mind by the generation
of hypotheses and knowledge, spiritual
practices strive to quiet
the mind through meditation or prayer.
And while science and philosophy (certainly
in the West) identify subjectivity with
the subject, this is regarded as (in the
Yoga tradition at least) as an illusion
borne out of ignorance: "According
to both the theory and practice of Yoga,
the mind is not the knower. The real knower
is above the mind and knows through
the mind and not with the mind."
Using the analogy of the way in which
inaudible radio waves can be converted
into music with the right receiving apparatus,
he suggested that mind be understood as
a quality that pervades us but extends
far beyond us it is both universal
and singular. Central to this is the idea
of the opposition between the universal
one-ness of the cosmos (a key insight
to be found in many spiritual traditions)
and the uniqueness of each thing in the
cosmos an opposition that
is fully acknowledged in Yoga. For Ravindra
this co-presence of opposition is more
than a mystical fancy. It is to be found
at all levels of reality and is exemplified
in the famous duality of wave and particle
that the split light experiment demonstrates.
The notion of opposition, duality and
complementarity seemed emerge as an underlying
theme in several talks at the conference.
Uziel Awret, for example, outlined the
way in which the varying interpretations
of quantum mechanics, and Bohrs
complementarity principle in particular,
can both enrich and constrain our capacity
to understand consciousness at a physical
level. Citing Georges Batailles
paradoxical principle of general
economy, in which "representation
always entails an irreducible and non-recouperable
loss in representation and meaning",
Awret suggested that the Copenhagen interpretation
of quantum mechanics renders physicalist
explanations of consciousness unavoidably
incomplete. Complementarity of another
kind in terms of complementary
approaches to medicine was also
the subject of several sessions, with
much time and emphasis given to the theory
and practice of meditation and the therapeutic
value of mindfulness, an approach
to self-awareness based on Eastern spiritual
knowledge.
In keeping with this spirit of mindfulness
and reflection, it was notable the extent
to which various speakers addressed, what
might be called, the ethical aspects of
Consciousness Studies. In a panel discussion
about the constructive applications of
spiritual and philosophical endeavour,
Metzinger asserted that the purpose of
all publicly funded consciousness research
should be to relieve human suffering.
This was echoed in John Pickerings
talk, which called for a more humane turn
in the study of mind, citing an openly
Buddhist concern for our fellow humans.
At certain points the underlying tension
between the scientific materialist and
contemplative spiritual approaches broke
through, with one delegate questioning
the scientific value of Ravindras
theological statements. Ravindra seemed
to sum up something about the conference
when he replied that what is of value
to science is less important than what
is of value to humanity.
Both the conference organisers and St
Annes College need to be thanked
for hosting this stimulating event. Whatever
Consciousness Studies might be, it still
manages to frustrate, confound, confuse
and inspire a whole generation of intellectuals
and academics, each of who is wise enough
to recognise their own specialty might
not hold all the answers. Meeting in such
congenial surroundings helps to generate
the sense of a widely dispersed collegium
that, despite the diversity of positions,
carries the exciting sense of a shared
enterprise.